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WHEN DOES AN ADVERTISEMENT ABOUT
ISSUES BECOME AN "ISSUES AD"?
Allison R. Hayward*
The law cannot regulate what it cannot define; and defining an issue ad
with clarity and precision is a challenge. Regulation of political activities
implicates the First Amendment rights of participants-but political in-
volvement can also create the appearance of corrupting quid pro quos
between activists and officials! This dilemma has been an issue for many
decades. The passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act's 2 (FECA)
comprehensive regulatory package (and the birth of an election law en-
forcement agency) forced the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo3 to
weigh the impulse to regulate money in politics with the protection of
political participation rights.
The Court in Buckley, and cases following, determined that contribu-
tion limits could constitutionally be imposed, but expenditure limits
* Former Legal Counsel for the National Republican Congressional Committee (1999).
Ms. Hayward is an attorney specializing in election law and government ethics issues in
California and Washington, D.C..
1. For an interesting discussion of the motives driving political participation of cor-
porations, see Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt
Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 885-88
(1997).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Briefly, Buckley contains several specific important holdings.
First, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended, impinged on the core First Amendment concerns of political expression and
association. See id. at 22, 65-66. The regulation of campaign finances must therefore sur-
vive "the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." Id. at 16. The Court also
determined that the sole justification for limiting political spending is the prevention of
corruption, whether actual or apparent. See id. at 48-49, 56-58. The Court also distin-
guished between expenditures and contributions. Expenditures are core political speech
and do not raise a danger of the corruption of candidates; hence, the Court in Buckley in-
validated FECA's restrictions on expenditures by candidates and independent commit-
tees. See id. at 21, 39.
Buckley's recognition that the First Amendment protects campaign and political discus-
sion reiterated previous holdings. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971) ("It can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[tlhere is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af-
fairs").
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could not; that disclosure of contributions and expenditures could be re-
quired, and that only speech containing "express advocacy" was political
enough to be deemed a "contribution" or "expenditure" as those terms
are used in federal election laws. Notably, prior to Buckley, the Second
Circuit had held that issue advocacy could not be made subject to cam-
paign finance disclosure requirements passed as part of FECA in 1971.4
It was not long before enterprising activists realized that advertise-
ments falling short of "express advocacy" might be effectively deployed
in a campaign-without following the restrictions and invasive disclosure
requirements of FECA-and the modern issue ad was born.
Reformers, sensing a loophole in the law, have called for restrictions
and disclosure requirements on this type of political issue advertising.
These proposals raise their own sets of questions. What is an issue ad?
Do some ads justify regulation, but not others? How much regulation?
Can they be regulated as "expenditures" or is something more lenient
required? Can regulators look to the purpose of the ad, or the context or
timing of the ad, or just the words used? In this context, one federal
court provided the less-than-helpful statement that "it is unclear what the
Supreme Court would say about the existence or extent of a constitu-
tional right of campaign-related issue advocacy."5
This Article focuses upon the first of these interrelated questions-
which advertisements are "issue ads" worthy of regulation? It first re-
views how issues and elections have historically intertwined.6 It then dis-
cusses and evaluates several attempts to define adequately such issue
ads-which ideally are meant to allow Congress and the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) to regulate "campaign" advertising while leaving
unmolested general political speech. The approaches discussed are the
proposed expansion of the definition of "express advocacy" (called here
the "Just Don't Look Right" approach),7 blackout periods,8 the "elec-
tioneering message," 9 and the regulation of speech solely due to its coor-
dination with a candidate or elected official (named here the "Company
One Keeps" standard). 0 Each method is set forth, along with any cases
4. See United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1140 (2d
Cir. 1972).
5. Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1313 (lstCir. 1997) (emphasis
added).
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
10. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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considering its merits or constitutionality. This Article concludes that
the offered issue advocacy standards are too broad and too vague to
withstand First Amendment scrutiny. By framing the issue as defining
what speech is sufficiently political to come under FECA regulation-
and demonstrating the imprecise nature of these regulations-this Arti-
cle demonstrates that vagueness and overbreadth flaws are common to
all these proposals, and all will fail judicial strict scrutiny.
I. WHAT IS AN "ISSUE AD"?
Issue advocacy and issue advertising are conventionally defined by
what they are not: They are not exhortations to vote in favor or against a
clearly identified candidate or political party in an election. The "ceil-
ing" for defining an issue ad is relatively clear because such "express ad-
vocacy" messages come within the regulation of FECA as either inde-
pendent expenditures or in-kind contributions. Further, "issue ads" do
not contain express advocacy and avoid such regulation.
More controversial is where to place the definitional "floor." When is
a message an "issue ad" that reformers would argue deserves regulation
because it would influence voters in an election (and thus potentially a
proper subject of election laws), and when is it a public policy statement
that should be free from disclosure and limit requirements?
A. Historic Examples
Before reviewing laws that attempt to define regulatable issue advo-
cacy, one should venture beyond recent "issue ads" and consider how is-
sues have been historically used in politics. Present debate on the regula-
tion and disclosure of issue advocacy has focused on the electoral
activities of corporations, labor organizations, and wealthy individuals
during the 1996 and 1998 campaigns. Yet, forms of independent issue
advocacy have been with our political system for decades. As one noted
political scientist stated in 1960, "[i]ndividuals have always paid for ad-
vertising and made other expenditures out of their own or somebody
else's funds without going through accountable committees.""
11. ALEXANDER HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 380 (1960). Writing fifteen
years before the implementation of modern election laws, Professor Heard continued:
Proportionally, a larger share of total campaign costs may well have been han-
dled thus in earlier days. More lenient tax laws made it easier... for wealthy in-
dividuals to accumulate and use large sums of cash for political purposes. The
increased emphasis on systematic party solicitations in the later period, moreo-
ver, would seem to draw more of the available funds into formal channels. These
are merely hunches, but in the absence of contrary evidence they appear plausi-
ble.
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What follows is admittedly an anecdotal review of how several issues
were raised in past campaigns. Nevertheless, this review should help
clarify how issues speech performs as a traditional component of politics.
As such, this speech should be left untrammeled by excessive regulation.
Some examples from the last two election cycles are then offered, to al-
low the reader to consider what, if anything, is different about today's
"campaign related issue ad."
1. Currency Reform
The free coinage of silver was an important national issue in the late
1800s, and was a major point of contention in the presidential race of
1896.12 In general, debtors and those with interests in silver mining sup-
ported "free silver"; creditors and industrialists favored the "sound
money" represented by the gold standard.
In July 1889, representatives of silver mining interests, along with po-
litical leaders from the South and West (including Members of Congress)
formed the American Bimetallic League with the goal of winning free
coinage of silver at a 16 to 1 ratio with gold. The League mobilized in
1893 when President Grover Cleveland called a special session of Con-
gress to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. The League set up a
national headquarters in Washington, D.C., and its first activities resem-
ble what we now refer to as an issue advocacy campaign:
The first announcements issued by this headquarters indicated
that the League was looking beyond the legislative session to
the fall elections. It announced that it planned to send free sil-
ver literature and to assign speakers to states that were holding
elections. The announcement stated that, since the middle and
eastern states were hopelessly opposed to free silver, the
League would concentrate its activities in the South and West.
Opponents to the free coinage of silver also pursued activities that to-
day could be described as "issue advocacy." Employers, especially the
railroads, posted placards in the workplace quoting favorable arguments,
and hired speakers on the money question to give classes and talk with
foremen about the monetary issue. Employers also placed leaflets about
the money issue in workers' pay envelopes, stating that the passage of
free silver would cut the purchasing power of their pay in half. Insurance
companies sent literature to their customers, warning that policies would
Id.
12. See generally STANLEY L. JONES, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECrION OF 1896 23
(1964).
13. Id. (footnote omitted).
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be canceled should "free silver" (in the form of William Jennings Bryan)
defeat William McKinley. Mortgage companies informed borrowers that
they could obtain loans only after the election, and then only if McKinley
defeated Bryan.4
2. Tariff Reform
In 1912, Woodrow Wilson ran on the New Freedom platform that,
among other reforms, promised lower tariffs. His Administration deliv-
ered, passing the Underwood Act" in 1913, which reduced tariffs to lev-
els not seen since the Civil War (from roughly 41% to 26%), and substi-
16tuted the income tax as a revenue source.
The tariff was a prominent issue in the 1916 campaign between Wilson
and Charles Evans Hughes. Pro-tariff interests advertised their support
for Hughes and pro-tariff Republican congressmen, predicting that after
the European war American workers would have to compete with
"[1]ow-paid European labor."'7 Thus, the "opportunity for the enjoy-
ment of necessaries in abundance will be lost."' 8 More apocalyptically,
"[w]ith it will go some of the comforts and luxuries of life, time for self-
culture, ownership of the family cottage and the responsible, contented,
14. See id. at 334-35. Political activity by corporations did not escape the attention of
reformers. One of the first reform efforts was made in New York State, where reformers
presented a proposal at the constitutional convention of 1894 that prohibited a corpora-
tion from "in any manner us[ing] any of its money or property for any political purpose
whatsoever ...... ELIHU ROOT, The Political Use of Money in ADDRESSES ON
GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP 141 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916).
Violation of this provision would be punished by the corporation losing its privilege to do
business in New York State. Speaking in favor of the measure, Elihu Root stated that it
would
prevent the great railroad companies, the great insurance companies, the great
telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth, from using their corpo-
rate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legislature to these halls,
in order to vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as
against those of the public.
Id. at 141-43. The breadth of this New York statute could encompass what we now call
issue advocacy, and Root's comments show that, even at that time reformers viewed such
speech as part of the political threat posed by large corporations.
15. Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
16. See generally Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson, ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA,
(visited Sept. 2, 1999) <http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/bios/28pwils.html>.
17. Tariff for Protection to American Wages and American Industries-Not for Reve-
nue Only, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1916, at 7 (advertisement). This advertisement discusses
the tariff, and calls for the election of Hughes in express terms, so it is not an "issue adver-
tisement."
18. Id.
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happy American home."19 Wilson responded by castigating the Republi-
can Party's support of higher tariffs with sarcasm, especially regarding
their concerns for cheap European goods.20
With this background as context, consider the following activity. On
November 3, 1916, just days before the election, an issue advertisement,
titled Deutschland Answers Wilson and signed by George W. Perkins, di-
rectly assailed Wilson's public comments.21 It criticized Wilson for his
anti-tariff views, and noted that "the Deutschland arose out of the ocean
yesterday with 10 million dollars worth of goods direct from Germany"
which demonstrated the capacity for Germany to dump inexpensive
goods on the American market after the war.2
19. Id.
20. See The President's Address, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1916, at 2.
21. See Deutschland Answers Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1916, at 10 (advertise-
ment). As one of the most generous supporters of the Progressive Party, George Wal-
bridge Perkins helped to keep it thriving. See GEORGE E. MOWRY, THEODORE
ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 263 (1946).
22. Deutschland Answers Wilson, supra note 21, at 10. The author could find no evi-
dence that the Wilson campaign, or anyone else, questioned Perkins's right to purchase
and place this advertisement.
This activity is similar in circumstances to that found to contain express advocacy in the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 865 (9th
Cir. 1987). Both are advertisements critical of presidential candidates for their stands,
placed by individuals in proximity to the election. In Furgatch, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that an ad entitled "Don't let him do it" (the "him" being President Carter), which was
published in the New York Times one week before the 1980 presidential election, consti-
tuted express advocacy. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit arguably adopted a broader, con-
text-based definition of "express advocacy." The Furgatch decision held that
speech need not include any of the words listed in Buckley to be express advo-
cacy under the Act, but it must, when read as a whole, and with limited reference
to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an
exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.
Id. at 864. The Furgatch decision has been subject to criticism for its broad reading of
"express advocacy" but other commentators note that the Furgatch standard, fully ap-
plied, reiterates a strict "express advocacy" requirement. See Bradley A. Smith, Soft
Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS.
179, 188 (1998). Similarly, the First Circuit applied and defended a rigid "magic words"
test in striking down an FEC regulation of voter guides. See Faucher v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
535 (1945) as cited in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976)); see also Federal Election
Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 948 (W.D. Va. 1995) (ruling that
an advertisement criticizing Presidential support for "radical" gay issues was issue advo-
cacy because it did not use "explicit words" calling for "electoral action"), affd, 92 F.3d
1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (mem.); Federal Election Comm'n v. Survival Educ. Fund Inc., 89 Civ.
0347, 1994 WL 9658 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 285, 289,
298 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a mailing claiming that Ronald Reagan's "anti-people
policies must be stopped" was not express advocacy).
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3. Temperance and Prohibition
Temperance advocates also participated actively in what today might
be deemed issue advocacy. Members of the Anti-Saloon League in New
York traveled across the state addressing "over five thousand" meetings
in support of "dry" members of the legislature during the 1918 cam-
paign.23 The Anti-Saloon League zealously opposed the election of
Democrat Alfred E. Smith in the 1928 Presidential campaign against
Herbert Hoover. 24 In late September and October of that year, the
League's efforts included national distribution of a leaflet entitled The
Next President and Prohibition through the press and churches. Hun-
dreds of thousands of other leaflets were distributed through state-levelS 21
Anti-Saloon leagues throughout the nation.
The League obtained funding from many of the same donors that also
funded the Republican Party in that day. The Democratic Party, for its
part, made an issue of the Republicans' overlapping personnel and finan-
cial sources in much the same way that reformers and opponents attack
groups today for coordination with parties and candidates.26
Although the law did not mandate disclosure of such groups' sources
of funds, subsequent congressional investigations revealed that many
Republican Party supporters gave to anti-Smith and pro-prohibition
groups, and Democratic Party supporters gave to groups opposing prohi-
bition."
4. Vietnam
The Vietnam War mobilized a variety of critics to adopt an "anyone
but Johnson" position. Such efforts rejected Johnson's candidacy in fa-
vor of some unspecified "peace" candidate. For example, in December
1967, the National Conference for New Politics ran an advertisement en-
titled Johnson v. Reagan? God Help Us, in which the group solicited
contributions for its efforts to promote peace candidates.2 Although the
advertisement mentions the candidacy of Eugene McCarthy favorably,
23. See LOuIS OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 47 (1932).
24. See id. at 48.
25. See id. at 48-49.
26. See Says Republicans Control Dry League, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1928, at 8. For
additional Smith campaign criticism of the Anti-Saloon League and other groups' activi-
ties against Smith (or on behalf of Hoover), see 'Political Parsons' Assailed by Ritchie,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1928, at 6.
27. See OVERACKER, supra note 23, at 166-67, 192-93.
28. See Johnson vs. Reagan? God Help Us., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1967, at E7 (adver-
stisement).
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the thrust of the group's message was to deny Johnson the nomination:
Our aim is to impress the professional Democratic politicians
all across the country. Once they are convinced that Mr. John-
son cannot win, and can only hurt them, they will have a vested
interest in dropping him ....
[O]ur lives have been blighted by a president who has misused
his power. He is the first problem, and he has to go.29
The advertisement was signed by Dr. Benjamin Spock and James
Rollins, co-chairmen of the group.
The advertisement's text criticized Johnson specifically on the war is-
sue, but did not advocate any specific alternative. Moreover, the adver-
tisement ran about a year before the 1968 election, so neither major
party had nominated a contender for that election (although at that time
Johnson appeared to be the likely Democratic party standard bearer).'
This brief review of how some issues blended with some notable cam-
paigns demonstrates the truism that issues and campaigns are inextrica-
bly entwined. Accordingly, efforts to limit the ability of individuals and
groups to talk about campaign issues will inevitably censor issue speech
generally. Setting aside the larger question of whether this would be
wise, the reader should consider simply the definitional problem based
upon the discussion so far. Can one make a principled distinction be-
tween the activities of the Anti-Saloon League and the American
Bimetallic League? Between George Perkins and Dr. Benjamin Spock?
Should each be treated the same?
29. Id.
30. This activity bears some similarity to the advertisement at issue in Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 839 F. Supp. 1448
(D. Colo. 1996). In Colorado Republican, the Colorado Republican Party prepared and
ran advertisements responding to advertisements produced by the Committee for Tim
Wirth. The Party's advertisements stated:
I just saw some ads where Tim Wirth said he's for a strong defense and a bal-
anced budget. But according to his record, Tim Wirth voted against every new
weapon system in the last five years. And he voted against the balanced budget
amendment.
Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he doesn't have a right to change
the facts.
Id. at 1451 (quoting allied court documents). The advertisement ran seven months before
the general election in November 1986, and before the Republicans had chosen a nominee
to face him in that election. The district court concluded that there was no express advo-
cacy in the advertisement. See id. at 1456.
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B. Recent Issue Advertising in Campaigns
Post-Watergate campaign finance laws have made it increasingly diffi-
cult for candidates and parties to raise funds to use directly for candidate
campaigns. For instance, the $1000 per individual contribution limit to
federal candidates established in 1974 was not indexed for inflation, and
today has roughly one-third the purchasing power it had then." Even so,
the growing reach of the federal government has raised the stakes for
corporations, unions, and other entities subject to federal regulation.32
Such interests began to observe in the late 1970s that independent activ-
ity, first in the form of "independent expenditures" and more recently in
the form of "issue advertising" could fill the perceived need to influence
politics, but in a way protected from limits and regulation by Supreme
Court interpretations of the First Amendment.
1. Examples of Recent Issue Ads
Among the most widely publicized issue advocacy campaigns was one
funded by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrialized
Organizations (AFL-CIO) during the 1996 election. The union approved
a special assessment of its members to fund a reported $35 million issue
advocacy effort, which targeted specific vulnerable Republican congres-
sional candidates that the union believed were opposed to its "working
families" agenda. For example, an AFL-CIO advertisement criticized
votes by House members' positions on education and student loans. It
ran in thirty-two districts and featured Carolyn and John Friedman of
Philadelphia. The Friedmans told viewers that
"Next year we will have two children in college and it will be
very hard to put them through - even with two incomes ....
Congressman __ voted with Newt Gingrich to cut college
loans while giving tax breaks to the wealthy. To take away op-
portunities for children to go to college is a crime ... Tell him
31. See Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
<ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt>; see also Kenneth N. Weine, Triggering
the First Amendment: Why Campaign Finance Systems that Include Triggers are Constitu-
tional, 24 J. LEGIS. 223, 227 (1998) (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
CAMPAIGN FINANCING 2 (1996) for the proposition that: "Since 1974 candidates have not
been able to raise more than $1000 per election from each individual contributor. Mean-
while, increases in the cost of living and campaign expenditures have made campaign costs
sextuple.").
32. See James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11
REGENT U. L. REV. 235, 284-85 (1998-99) (explaining that "as the level of government
benefits increases, competition for government transfers of wealth will naturally tend to
increase campaign expenditures").
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his priorities are all wrong."33
Similarly, AFL-CIO funded advertisements urged viewers to "[c]all
J.D. Hayworth [R-AZ] and tell him not to destroy Medicare" and to
"[c]all Congressman Hostettler. Tell him it's time to start rewarding
work. Tell him it's time to raise the minimum wage. '" The union media
campaign against Representative Hayworth alone was estimated to cost
$2 million.35
Numerous other groups, including the major political parties, also
sought to communicate with voters via issue advertisements. For exam-
ple, both the Democratic and Republican parties spent tens of millions of
dollars in the 1996 cycle on issue advertising, some designed to bolster
the parties' Presidential nominees, but others targeted at assisting or de-
feating congressional candidates.36
2. Character of a Contemporary "Issue Ad"
Most "campaign related" issue advertisements used today contain sev-
eral features. They establish a sympathetic position on an issue, such as
taxes, term limits, education spending, or health care. Then, they either
praise or criticize a particular officeholder for their position on this issue.
This criticism may reference a statement made by the officeholder, a vote
cast on a piece of legislation, or may involve establishing guilt-by-
association by linking the official with an unpopular party figure. Finally,
they may urge the viewer to take some kind of action other than voting
for or against the officeholder. Many ads ask the viewer to call the offi-
cial regarding the issue (some providing the phone number or a toll-free
number that will connect the caller to the office). This final "call to ac-
tion" acknowledges court cases that have held that to contain "express
advocacy," a message must include an exhortation to vote for or against a
candidate.37 By explicitly advising the viewer to do something else (such
as call the candidate) the advertisements are designed to avoid regulation
33. Mike Hall, Labor '96 is Pinching Foes at Grass Roots (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
<http://www.aflcio.org/pubi/newsonline/96sep2O/roots.htm>.
34. Whiff of Scandal (visited Oct. 24, 1999) <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
search.html> (search for "whiff of scandal").
35. See Chuck Raasch, Scandal Notwithstanding, Political Fund Raising Continues
Unabated, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wire Service Stories File.
36. See Eliza Newlin Carney, Party Time, 42 NAT'L J. 2214 (Oct. 19, 1996); Ruth
Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The System Cracks Under the Weight of Cash, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9,1997, at Al.
37. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 249 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976).
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as campaign expenditures. Although popular, this is not a required in-
gredient of an issue ad-the only requirement is that the advertisement
not contain "express advocacy" for or against a clearly identified candi-
date.
No clear line separates issue advertisements of the "campaign" variety
such as those discussed above, and direct lobbying regarding issues and
legislation. In its study of issue advocacy in the 1996 campaign, the An-
nenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania cata-
logued issue advertisements from more than two dozen organizations "at
an estimated total expense of $135 million to $150 million., 38 It included
in its survey advertisements funded by the Arthur S. De Moss Founda-
tion as part of its "Life: What a Beautiful Choice" campaign, an anti-
abortion campaign that has been running nationally since 1992.' 9 The
survey also included advertising by the Human Rights Campaign in 1996
in the Washington D.C. area about job discrimination against gays and
lesbians.4n Recently, the Annenberg Center released a report on tobacco
issue ads that opposed the tobacco settlement legislation.41 This report
discussed the inaccuracies contained in the advertisements sponsored by
tobacco companies, and called the effort "the first large-scale issue advo-
cacy campaign with the potential to set the issue agenda for the Novem-
ber elections."42
Lobbying advertisements, such as those run by the De Moss Founda-
tion, the Human Rights campaign, and tobacco companies, are different
in kind from campaign-related issue advertising, and should not usually
raise the same concerns.43 When issue advertising critics focus upon the
obvious campaign character of the more political issue advertisements,
38. DEBORAH BECK, ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996
CAMPAIGN 3 (1997) (Annenberg Public Policy Center Report Series No. 16), available at
<http://www.appcpenn.org/pubs.htm>. Reformers rely on this report as an authoritative
treatment of campaign issue advocacy. See, e.g., Becky Cain, Sham Issues Ads: Solutions
to a Clear Record of Abuse, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 72 (1998).
39. See BECK, ET AL., supra note 38, at 36.
40. See id. at 41.
41. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson, "Tax and Spend" vs. "Little Kids": Advocacy and
Accuracy in the Tobacco Settlement Ads of 1997-8 (Annenberg Public Policy Center, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania), Aug. 6, 1998 (visited Aug. 27, 1999)<http://www.appcpenn.org/
issueads/pastresearch.html>.
42. Id. at 2.
43. See David A. Pepper, Recasting the Issue Ad: The Failure of the Court's Issue Ad-
vocacy Standards, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 141 (1997) (contrasting legislative issue ads with
campaign issue ads); Will Closing a Campaign Finance Loophole Strangle Nonprofit Issue
Advocacy, RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY (Winter/Spring 1998) <http://www.ncrp.org/
articles/rp/campfinref.htm>.
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and discuss their regulation as a necessary component of a comprehen-
sive campaign finance system, their proposals may sweep far more
broadly to include traditional lobbying speech. As the historical review
of issue advertising and the Annenberg Report both demonstrate, the
line between campaign issue advocacy and issue lobbying is unclear.
Moreover, providing a definition of an "issue ad" that protects non-
campaign speech remains an elusive goal. Consequently, we next exam-
ine how regulators, reformers, and enforcement agencies have attempted
to cope.
II. DEFINING AND REGULATING AN ISSUE ADVERTISEMENT
Advertisements during campaigns present a tempting target. Regula-
tors suspect that such activity is campaign related, and seek to enforce
the disclosure and limit requirements of federal election laws against
those sponsoring these messages. A number of methods are used to de-
fine what issue advocacy these laws should reach. Each approach, how-
ever, comes with its own constitutional baggage.
A. Just Don't Look Right
Within this category fall those regulations that reach issues advocacy
because of facts and circumstances surrounding the message, without jus-
tifying how their presence (or relative magnitude) makes the speech
subject to regulation. The chief way to regulate issues ads that "just
don't look right" is by crafting a broad definition of "express advocacy."
The Shays-Meehan legislation"4 provides a definition of "express advo-
cacy" that is broader than the standard used by federal courts, so that
more communications will be treated as contributions or expenditures
under this standard. Specifically, House Bill 417 provides for the fol-
lowing definition of "express advocacy":
(A)IN GENERAL.- The term "express advocacy" means a
communication that advocates the election or defeat of a candi-
date by-
(i) containing a phrase such as "vote for", "re-elect", "sup-
port", "cast your ballot for", "(name of candidate) for
Congress", "(name of candidate) in 1997", "vote against",
"defeat", "reject", or a campaign slogan or words that in
context can have no reasonable meaning other than to ad-
vocate the election or defeat of one or more clearly identi-
fied candidates;
44. H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999).
[Vol. 49:63
1999]When Does An Advertisement About Issues Become an "Issues Ad"? 75
(iii) expressing unmistakable and unambiguous support
for or opposition to one or more clearly identified candi-
dates when taken as a whole and with limited reference to
external events, such as proximity to an election.45
The FEC has also approved a regulatory definition of "expressly advo-
cating" broader than the court-articulated definition of "express advo-
cacy," which was designed to capture a broader array of activities within
federal restrictions and disclosure requirements. 46 Like Shays-Meehan,
this definition includes not just communications that use phrases such as
"vote for," "elect," "defeat," and the like, but also words "which in con-
text can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or
defeat" of a candidate, or communications "[w]hen taken as a whole and
with limited reference to external events... could only be interpreted by
a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of
one or more clearly identified candidates .... 47
Since its adoption, several litigants have successfully challenged the
FEC's regulatory express advocacy definition. The First and Fourth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals both concluded that the definition was unconsti-
tutionally broad because it permitted the regulation of speech protected
by the First Amendment, as did the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.48 No federal court has upheld the regula-
tion against a challenge.49
45. Id. at § 201(b). This section also provides an exception for voting records and
voting guides. See id.
46. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (1999).
47. Id.
48. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049,
1064 (4th Cir. 1997); Right to Life v. Federal Election Comm'n, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F.
Supp. 8, 14 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
49. A provision of the 1974 Act challenged in Buckley related more specifically to
issue advocacy and the court of appeals ruled it unconstitutional. This provision is remi-
niscent of the broad electioneering standard used by the FEC General Counsel's office, as
well as broad redefinitions of "express advocacy" at the federal and state levels. That pro-
vision provided that any group or individual engaged in
any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an
election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material referring to a
candidate.., setting forth the candidate's position on any public issue, his voting
record, or other official acts ... or otherwise designed to influence individuals to
cast their votes for or against such candidates or to withhold their votes for such
candidate shall file reports with the Commission [as if they were a political com-
mitteel.
2 U.S.C. § 437a (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976). The court of appeals in Buckley
found this language unconstitutional, because it was vague and violated the constitutional
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Perhaps the most audacious example of the "Just don't look right" ap-
proach was in a recent Wisconsin state enforcement action." That state's
requirement that groups making contributions and expenditures register
as political committees was the basis of an enforcement action against
several organizations that sponsored issue advertisements. The adver-
tisements, broadcast in October 1996, discussed a state legislator's votes
on specific issues and urged the viewer to call the legislator to protest or
express support for the position. For instance, one advertisement asked
the viewer to "Call Senator Clausing. Tell her to stop voting with those
Madison liberals."51 The legislators under criticism filed complaints with
the Wisconsin Elections Board, and Board staff determined that the ad-
vertisements were subject to registration and reporting requirements be-
cause they were broadcast for "political purposes. 5 2 The legislators also
filed actions for injunctive relief in state court, which (remarkably) were
granted during the final days of the 1996 campaign.
In March of 1997, the Election Board found that the advertisements
rights of groups engaged in protected speech. The court stated:
To be sure, any discussion of important public questions can possibly exert some
influence on the outcome of an election .... But unlike contributions and ex-
penditures made solely with a view to influencing the nomination or election of a
candidate, issue discussions unwedded to the cause of a particular candidate
hardly threaten the purity of elections. Moreover, and very importantly, such
discussions are vital and indispensable to a free society and an informed elector-
ate. Thus the interest of a group engaging in nonpartisan discussion ascends to a
high plane, while the governmental interest in disclosure correspondingly dimin-
ishes.
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). The court of
appeals concluded that this provision was not a "core section and is plainly severable from
the balance of the legislation." Id. at 843. It considered construing the language narrowly,
but declined to do so after concluding that any constitutionally permissible construction
would make the provisions of this section coterminous with other provisions providing for
registration and reporting of political committees. See id. at 874-78. Further, by adding
this section, Congress showed an intent to reach a broader array of organizations. See id.
This aspect of the court's decision was not appealed by the statute's challengers (it was the
only point upon which the challengers prevailed at the court of appeals), so the Supreme
Court was not presented directly with the question of whether all campaign speech must
contain "express advocacy" to be subject to registration and reporting requirements in dis-
closure laws.
50. See Elections Bd. of Wisc. v. Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce, No. 97-CV-1729
(Wisc. Cir. Ct., Dane County Jan. 16, 1998) (dismissing complaint with prejudice). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court granted the parties' joint petition to bypass the state's court of
appeals, see 585 N.W.2d 160 (Wis. 1998) (mem.), and subsequently affirmed the circuit
court, see 597 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. 1999). According to LEXIS, a petition for certiorari was
filed with the United States Supreme Court on October 5, 1999.
51. 597 N.W.2d at 725 n.3.
52. See id. at 725-26. See also Memorandum from George A. Dunst, Legal Counsel,
Wisconsin Election Board to Election Board Members (Mar. 13, 1997) (on file with the
Catholic University Law Review).
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were "express advocacy" and thus the sponsors were subject to Wiscon-
sin disclosure laws. When the sponsors still refused to comply on First
Amendment grounds, the Election Board filed suit. The trial court con-
cluded that the state could adopt a definition of express advocacy that
differed from the one articulated by the Supreme Court, as long as that
definition met "constitutional demands."53 Concluding that the state had
failed to do this, the court dismissed the state's complaint.54 On appeal,
the state's attorney argued that Buckley did not provide a bright line for
state regulation, doubting that a court could draw such a line that could
not be circumvented by advertising copywriters. The state attorney in-
stead argued that express advocacy questions should be handled like ob-
scenity-where a court does not define it but "'knows it when it sees
it."55
The "Just don't look right" approach uses a vague facts and circum-
stances rationale to regulate political speech ad hoc. When taking the
form of a redefinition of express advocacy, this method tries to pass as an
acceptable constitutional standard. Nevertheless, each court that has
considered the question has determined that broad express advocacy
definitions are unconstitutional. The most extreme example of this ap-
proach may be that used by the state prosecutors in the Wisconsin mat-
ter. Here, the vague contours and arbitrary character of such a facts and
circumstances test shows no regard for the protection of political speech.
Furthermore, analogizing campaign speech with obscenity is especially
revealing. Obscene speech has never been protected, and in fact is
thought hazardous and needful of criminalization. Political speech, on
the other hand, arguably enjoys the Constitution's most vigilant protec-
tion and is thought beneficial. The Wisconsin prosecutor's statement
demonstrates that to some enforcement authorities issues speech is
thought hazardous and criminal. Surely the Founding Fathers, not to
mention the federal bench, would disagree.
53. No. 97-CV-1729, slip op. at 28.
54. See id. at 29.
55. Sally Garbo Wedde, State High Court Hears Arguments About the Limits of Issue
Advocacy, 2 Money & Politics Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 207-08 (Jan. 20, 1999) (discussing ar-
gument in Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce). The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
Board failed to define properly the regulation it enforced in this matter, but also con-
cluded that the breadth of the regulation was a proper inquiry for the Board or the legisla-
ture (i.e. the court did not automatically set the standard judicially as Buckley's express
advocacy test). See 597 N.W.2d at 736-37. Readers should note that this case involved
disclosure, not prohibition, of speech activity. See Matt Pommer & David Callender, High
Court OKs Issue Ad Curbs; But Also Says Business Lobby Did Not Get Fair Warning,
Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), July 7, 1999, at 1A.
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B. Blackout periods
Another approach is to define and regulate issue ads by virtue of their
proximity to an election. "Blackout periods" (also called "time buffers")
distinguish between "issue ads" that should be regulated and speech that
should be left unregulated by crafting a bright-line based on the proxim-
ity of the advertisement to the relevant election. In the Shays-Meehan
legislation, one of the definitions of express advocacy contains such a
"blackout period." It reads:
[a communication] referring to one or more clearly identified
candidates in a paid advertisement that is transmitted through
radio or television within 60 calendar days preceding the date of
an election of the candidate and that appears in the State in
which the election is occurring, except that with respect to a
candidate for the office of Vice President or President, the time
period is within 60 calendar days preceding the date of a gen-
eral election.56
Supporters of campaign finance reform legislation contend that a time
buffer would "close the loophole" for "sham issue ads" run "immediately
before an election that savage a candidates [sic] opponent" and "are de-
signed to influence the outcome of elections, but are not subject to the
same rules as campaign ads ... ."7 Blackout periods have not done well,
however, when challenged in court. In July of 1998, the Michigan Secre-
56. H.R. 417, 106th Cong. § 201(b)(20)(A)(ii) (1999).
57. League of Women Voters, Campaign Finance Reform in the 106th Congress, (vis-
ited Aug. 30, 1999) <http://www.lwv.org/cfrhome.html>; Restrictions on Political Speech:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
available in LEXIS, FDCH Testimony File (May 6, 1999) (testimony of Glenn J. Mora-
marco, Senior Attorney, New York University School of Law) ("[Wie cannot permit sham
'issue ads' which do nothing beyond advocating the election or defeat of a named candi-
date, from undermining the valid limitations placed by the law on electioneering activ-
ity."). Moramarco suggested in his testimony that objective criteria, such as blackout pe-
riods, should create a rebuttable presumption that the advertisement is regulable
electioneering. Moramarco explains: "The use of a rebuttable presumption can provide a
safety net for the unusual cases that detractors of these laws are so fond of inventing-
such as ads denouncing President Johnson during the height of the Vietnam War." Id.
Moramarco does not elaborate upon how these ads, which were a part of the political de-
bate, are a mere "invention" of "detractors." See also Lynn Bonner, Campaign Finance
Bill Advances, NEWS & OBSERVER, June 2, 1999, at A3 (discussing blackout period in
state legislation, to address "bogus issue ads ... 'a new phenomenon in American poli-
tics'); U.S. Rep. Christopher Shays (R-CT) Holds News Conference on Campaign Finance
Issues, FDCH Political Transcripts, May 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, Legislation & Poli-
tics Library (supporting "strong campaign finance reform ... that will call sham issue ads
what they truly are-campaign ads").
The denigration of certain issue advertising as "shams" is not limited to statements in
the popular press or before Congress. See Cain, supra note 38, at 71.
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tary of State promulgated a regulation to interpret that state's prohibi-
tion on corporate contributions or expenditures in political campaigns
(except for ballot questions)." This regulation provided that
an expenditure for a communication that uses the name or like-
ness of 1 or more specific candidates is subject to the prohibi-
tion on contributions and expenditures ... if the communica-
tion is broadcast or distributed within 45 calendar days before
the date of an election in which the candidate's name is eligible
to appear on the ballot."
The Right to Life of Michigan Committee successfully obtained an in-
junction against enforcement of this rule, contending that it was facially
overbroad under the Constitution.6 The court noted that the rule was
"based upon the assumption that when advertisements mention the
name of a candidate, they are not issue ads but rather candidate ads ....
The Court cannot accept the State's assumption that any mention of a
candidate within forty-five days of an election necessarily falls within the
scope of express advocacy.",6' The court added that the state failed to cite
any authority to support "its proposition that the limited time period jus-
tifies the restriction on issue advocacy.,
62
The State of West Virginia also attempted to regulate a subset of issue
advocacy-voter guides-by amending into its state law a presumption
that any scorecards, voter guides, or other analysis of a candidate's posi-
tions or votes, published or distributed within sixty days of an election is
presumed to be "for the purpose of advocating or opposing the nomina-
tion, election or defeat of any candidate., 63 A group challenged this law
as a violation of the First Amendment because it regulated political
speech beyond that containing express advocacy.64
In the district court's opinion granting the group's motion seeking a
preliminary injunction, the court stated that plaintiff was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits because the Supreme Court has articulated a bright
58. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 169.39b (1979) (rescinded 1989) (interpreting MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 169.254).
59. Id.
60. See Right to Life of Michigan, Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Mich.
1998).
61. Id. at 768.
62. Id. at 769.
63. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5(e)(1) (1999).
64. See West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954, 960 (S.D. W. Va.
1996) (granting preliminary injunction); see also 952 F. Supp. 342, 348 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
(awarding fees and costs); 960 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (decision on sum-
mary judgment motion).
Catholic University Law Review
line standard that separated express advocacy, which could be subject to
regulation, from issue advocacy, which could not be regulated.65 The
court specifically criticized the presumption that scorecards or voter
guides distributed within sixty days of an election could be regulated as
express advocacy.66 Moreover, in its decision awarding attorneys fees
and costs, the court justified charging these fees against the state because
the statute "attempted to circumvent legal precedent through the trans-
parent device of a presumption that expenditures made within sixty days
of an election are express advocacy." 67
In 1997, the Vermont legislature enacted a campaign finance reform
measure, which provided disclosure requirements for "political adver-
tisements" and reporting requirements for "mass media activities."68 The
state legislature defined political advertisements as "'any communication
... which expressly or implicitly advocates the success or defeat of a can-
didate.' 69 "Mass media activities" comprised communications that in-
cluded the name or likeness of a candidate for office. Political adver-
tisements were required to carry the sponsor's name and address, and
designate the candidate, party, or committee on whose behalf it was
published. Persons spending $500 or more within thirty days of an elec-
tion on mass media activities would be required to report the expendi-
tures to the state and to the candidate whose likeness appeared in the
spot, within twenty-four hours of making the expenditure. 7 The United
States District Court for the District of Vermont held in Vermont Right
to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrel7' that, to save the statutes from uncon-
stitutionality, political advertisements and the expenditures for mass me-
dia activities must be narrowly construed to apply only to messages con-
taining express advocacy.7
Blackout period proposals have been made not just by pro-regulation
reformers, but by congressional leaders known for their skepticism about
campaign finance reform, most notable Representative Bill Thomas (R-
Cal.). Thomas has reasoned that issue ads presented within ninety days
of an election could be constitutionally subject to regulation because
65. See West Virginians for Life, 919 F. Supp. at 959.
66. See West Virginians for Life, 960 F. Supp. at 1039-40.
67. West Virginians for Life, 952 F. Supp. at 348.
68. See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204, 207-08 (D.
Vt. 1998) (summarizing Vermont General Assembly Act 64 of 1997).
69. Id. at 208.
70. See id. at 207-08.
71. 19 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Vt. 1998).
72. See id. at 215-16.
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House rules already prohibit taxpayer-financed mass mailings within
ninety days of an election. He noted that, although such advertising may
not be subject to the same limits as prohibitions on contributions, "at the
very least, [such communications] could be subject to all of the disclosure
requirements. Disclosure would ensure that the public knows how much
groups and individuals are spending, and the source of the money. 73
Use of blackout periods presents practical as well as constitutional
questions. With states holding their primaries earlier in the year (espe-
cially during the presidential election), this rule may make national lob-
bying activities difficult as the sixty or ninety-day pre-primary period
overlaps with off-year non-election related activity.
C. The FEC Formula: Electioneering + Clearly Identified Candidate =
Expenditure
The FEC's Office of the General Counsel interprets FECA to permit
regulation of "electioneering messages" featuring "clearly identified
candidates., 74 According to the General Counsel, this formula has been
developed by the Commission in Advisory Opinions, to explain what
messages are "for the purposes of influencing a federal election" as that
phrase is used in the Act to define "expenditure., 75 Hence, if a message
is "electioneering" and includes a clearly identified federal candidate, it
would come within FECA regulation notwithstanding that under federal
cases interpreting FECA it would be an issue ad.
While the FEC has never articulated a stand-alone definition of "elec-
tioneering message," the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in its
(vacated) opinion in Federal Elections Commission v. Colorado Republi-
can Federal Campaign Committee76 considered the scope of "election-
eering message., 77 The Tenth Circuit stated that an electioneering mes-
sage would include statements designed to urge the public to elect a
73. Rep. Bill Thomas, Ads Could Be Regulated in Last 90 Days of Election, ROLL
CALL, Jan. 9, 1997, at 32.
74. FEC Advisory Op. 1984-15, Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5766
(1984).
75. FEC Advisory Op. 1985-14, Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5819
(1985); FEC Advisory Op. 1984-15, Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5766 (1984).
The definition of "expenditure" is found at 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (1994).
76. 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996).
77. See 59 F.3d at 1023. When a decision is vacated, it is "rendered void," "set aside,"
or "rescinded." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (5th ed. 1979). Nevetheless, the FEC
Office of General Counsel continues to employ the electioneering standard to define the
scope of the phrase "in connection with a federal election." See infra notes 79-80 and ac-
companying text. Black's does not provide a definition of "electioneering."
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certain candidate or party, or diminish support for a candidate or party."
This definition was not ruled upon by the Supreme Court in Colorado
Republican. Instead, the Court addressed the issue of whether party ex-
penditure limitations in federal law were unconstitutional as applied to
an independent party expenditure, and assumed without discussion that
the activity at issue was an "expenditure"-whatever the standard.79
Why is the electioneering standard of concern? After all, the only case
to address its scope was vacated. Nevertheless, FEC staff continue to
apply this standard as a definition of the phrase "in connection with an
election" so the electioneering standard continues to be one that political
activists must take into account when planning their activities.,
FEC staff used this approach in the audit report of the Clinton/Gore
Primary Committee to determine that the Democratic National Commit-
tee (DNC) made excessive contributions of $46,580,358 by coordinating
issue advertisements with Clinton/Gore. In fact, the Audit Division ex-
plicitly stated in its analysis that it "does not agree ... that the 'express
advocacy' standard must be met before such spending constitutes a con-
tribution to the candidate."'" The Commission decided not to include
78. See Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1023.
79. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 613 (1996). On remand, the district court
considered a facial challenge to the party expenditure restrictions, and did not confront
whether this activity fit the definition of a federal "expenditure." See Federal Election
Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo.
1999).
The "electioneering" formulation also appeared to be the standard used by the U.S.
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activi-
ties in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns (the Senate Special Investiga-
tion) in its discussion of improper coordination of issue advertising between the Clinton
White House and the DNC. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 105TH
CONG. 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT, INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER
ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, S. REP. No.
105-167, at 125 (1998) [hereinafter SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT].
80. The Commission explained its use of "electioneering" rather than "express advo-
cacy" in briefs filed before the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican. See Brief for Re-
spondent at 22, Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489). It stated that the "express advocacy" standard was only
applicable to "independent expenditures," not the definition of "expenditure" generally
-and more specifically, not as "expenditure" is used in the "coordinated expenditure"
context. Id. at 21. The FEC makes this argument despite the fact that the phrase "in con-
nection with" used in other parts of FECA has been construed to mean "express advo-
cacy" by the Supreme Court. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1986).
81. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON
CLINTON/GORE 96 PRIMARY COMMITrEE, INC., FEC Agenda Doc. 98-85, at 33 n.26
[hereinafter CLINTON AUDIT REPORT]. Notably, the Audit Division cites the vacated
Tenth Circuit decision in Colorado Republican as support, but claims inaccurately that it
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these expenditures as excessive in-kind contributions, although the audit
report also states that the Commission has not reached any conclusion
concerning the FEC staff's analysis."
The electioneering standard is not supported by any legal authority.
Worse, it provides no guidance to political speakers who must guess at
the audience's reaction to a message to determine whether the message is
an "expenditure" regulated by FECA. It also opens up the internal deci-
sionmaking and motives of the speaker to investigation by FEC attor-
neys. As explained by the petitioners in their brief before the Supreme
Court in Colorado Republican: "[T]hat '[electioneering] standard' is ill-
defined, open-ended and subjective. It requires post-hoc analysis by the
FEC, which intrusively investigates alleged violations of [FECA] by ex-
amining the subjective intent of the speaker and the subjective interpre-
tation of the audience."83
The problems with the electioneering standard are not lost on some
members of the Commission. Both Commissioners Mason and Sand-
strom explained in the FEC's open hearing on the audit report that the
"electioneering" standard was insufficiently defined to put the parties on
sufficient notice of what activities would be "electioneering. '8  The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia agreed when "electioneering"
was invoked in a different context: "'electioneering' raise[s] virtually the
same vagueness concerns as the language 'influencing any election for
Federal office,' the raw application of which the Buckley Court deter-
was "reversed on other grounds" by the Supreme Court. Id. at 32 n.25. See also Colorado
Republican, 59 F.3d at 1023.
82. See CLINTON AUDIT REPORT, supra note 81, at 6-7. The audit report also states
that its analysis is of its staff and not of the Office of the General Counsel of the FEC.
Nevertheless, General Counsel Larry Noble defended the use of the "clearly identified
candidate plus electioneering message" standard during the Commission's open meetings
in which the audits were discussed. See Audio tape of the Federal Election Commission
Open Meeting (Dec. 3, 1998) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review). During
this meeting, an Audit staff member defended the Audit's conclusions. The Audit staff
concluded that an advertisement that ran 14 months before the election, before Bob Dole
had been nominated as the Republican candidate for president, that criticized Dole's role
in the budget, was an in-kind contribution and contained an electioneering message be-
cause "the ad in its entirety along with the visuals of Senator Dole ... would meet the
electioneering message standard and would tend to diminish public support for one candi-
date and to garner support for the other (namely the President)." Id. Noble represented
to the Commission that the clearly identified/electioneering standard he applied to this
activity was "not the audit divisions standard. This is the Commission's standard." (citing
FEC Advisory Opinions 1985-14 and 1984-15 issued by the Commission). Id. at 61.
83. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Colorado Republican (No. 95-489). The petitioners
continued: "[Tihe 'electioneering message' formulation boils down to a classic 'totality of
the circumstances' test in which the answer can never be known in advance." Id. at 40.
84. Audio tape of the Federal Election Commission Open Meeting (Dec. 3,1998) (on
file with the Catholic University Law Review).
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mined would impermissibly impinge on First Amendment values."85 Yet
the "electioneering" formulation, by reaching vaguely "campaign-like"
issue ads, satisfies the regulatory impulse to bring this activity within
FECA, notwithstanding constitutional requirements that regulations of
political speech be narrowly tailored and sufficiently precise to provide
notice of their application to speakers.
D. The Company One Keeps
Issue advocacy can also be regulated through guilt by association-
regulating messages because of the identity of individuals or groups in-
volved. The first example of this is part of the definition of "issue advo-
cacy" provided in Shays-Meehan. In this example, issue ads are singled
out for regulation as an expenditure under FECA only when funding for
them is coordinated by a presidential candidate receiving public financ-
ing. This measure defines issue advocacy as
any activity carried out for the purpose of influencing the con-
sideration or outcome of any Federal legislation or the issuance
or outcome of any Federal regulations, or educating individuals
about candidates for election for Federal office or any Federal
legislation, law, or regulations (without regard to whether the
activity is carried out for the purpose of influencing any election
for Federal office).86
Another way the "company you keep" may change the treatment of is-
sue speech is through an expansive definition of "coordination," which
deems any coordinated message (so defined) to be a campaign contribu-
tion. Shays-Meehan, for instance, does this through a broad definition of
"coordination." 87 This provision would broaden the category of expendi-
85. Federal Election Comm'n v. GOPAC, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 851, 861-62 (D.D.C.
1996) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1996)). These recent examples are not the
only instances of the judiciary grappling with the vagaries of the word "electioneering."
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 223 (1966) (Harlan, J., separate op.); United States v.
Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW-CIO),
352 U.S. 567, 591-92 (1957). In other contexts, the Court seemingly considers election-
eering as a synonym of "express advocacy." See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 194-202
(1992).
86. H.R. 417, 106th Cong. § 1301(a) (1999). The version of Shays-Meehan passed by
the House in 1998 contained the same language. See H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. § 1401(a)
(1998). This provision addresses conduct like that pursued by the Clinton Administration
in its coordination of the issue advocacy expenditures of the DNC in 1996. See SENATE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 79, at 53-129 (discussing coordination of
DNC, Clinton/Gore, and White House). Notably, this White House coordination was pur-
sued under counsel's advice. See id. at 59. The report fails to show that this advice was
incorrect.
87. See H.R. 417 § 206(a)(1)(B). The proposed legislation would also prohibit politi-
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cal parties from making both coordinated and independent expenditures on behalf of a
candidate, and would provide a broad definition of coordination that would include:
(i) A payment made by a person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, at
the request or suggestion of, or pursuant to any general or particular under-
standing with a candidate, the candidate's authorized committee, the political
party of the candidate, or an agent acting on behalf of a candidate, authorized
committee, or the political party of the candidate.
(ii) A payment made by a person for the production, dissemination, distribution,
republication, in whole or in part, of any broadcast or any written, graphic, or
other form of campaign material prepared by a candidate, a candidate's author-
ized committee, or an agent of a candidate or authorized committee (not includ-
ing a communication described in paragraph (9)(B)(i) or a communication that
expressly advocates the candidate's defeat).
(iii) A payment made by a person based on information about a candidate's
plans, projects, or needs provided to the person making the payment by the can-
didate or the candidate's agent who provides the information with the intent that
the payment be made.
(iv) A payment made by a person if, in the same election cycle in which the pay-
ment is made, the person making the payment is serving or has served as a mem-
ber, employee, fundraiser, or agent of the candidate's authorized committee in an
executive or policymaking position.
(v) A payment made by a person if the person making the payment has served in
any formal policy making or advisory position with the candidate's campaign or
has participated in formal strategic or formal policymaking discussions ... with
the candidate's campaign ....
(vi) A payment made by a person if, in the same election cycle, the person mak-
ing the payment retains the professional services of any person that has provided
or is providing campaign-related services in the same election cycle to a candi-
date (including services provided through a political committee of the candidate's
political party) in connection with the candidate's pursuit of nomination for elec-
tion, or election, to Federal office ....
(vii) A payment made by a person who has directly participated in fundraising
activities with the candidate or in the solicitation or receipt of contributions on
behalf of the candidate.
(viii) A payment made by a person who has communicated with the candidate or
an agent of the candidate (including a communication through a political com-
mittee of the candidate's political party), after the declaration of candidacy (in-
cluding a pollster, media consultant, vendor, advisor, or staff member acting on
behalf of the candidate), about advertising message, allocation of resources,
fundraising, or other campaign matters related to the candidate's campaign, in-
cluding campaign operations, staffing, tactics, or strategy.
(ix) The provision of in-kind professional services or polling data (including
services or data provided through a political committee of the candidate's politi-
cal party) to the candidate or candidate's agent.
(x) A payment made by a person who has engaged in a coordinated activity with
a candidate described in clauses (i) through (ix) for a communication that clearly
refers to the candidate or the candidate's opponent and is for the purpose of in-
fluencing that candidate's election (regardless of whether the communication is
express advocacy).
Id. This language is broader than that approved by Congress in House Bill 2183 because
of the addition of the political party elements to the definition. Compare id. (proposed 2
U.S.C. § 431(8)(c)(viii)-(ix)), with H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. § 206(a)(1)(B) (1998) (proposed
2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(C)(ix)-(x)).
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tures that, by virtue of such coordination, are subject to limits and prohi-
bitions as in-kind contributions or as reportable "expenditures" under
the legislation's broad definition of that term. The ten parts of this coor-
dination definition include issues speech made by persons or groups that
retain a common campaign consultant as a related candidate or even the
candidate's political party. It also includes speech by persons who, in the
same election cycle, met with the candidate in "formal strategic or formal
policymaking discussions" regardless of whether the issue ad had any-
thing to do with the policy discussed."
Setting aside the fact that defining the scope of "formal strategic or
formal policymaking discussions" will require the FEC to engage in inva-
sive factual inquiries into the operations of private political actors, the
regulation burdens speech solely because of the speaker's political activi-
ties. By implication, such activities contaminate the unrelated issues ad-
vocacy of political players as "corrupting." The animus this approach
shows toward political activity is breathtaking.
The FEC has stated its belief that coordinated issue advertising, like
coordinated express advocacy, can be regulated as in-kind contributions.
Coordination has been a part of federal election law for many years. It
has been used to differentiate between independent expenditures (which
contain express advocacy and are reportable but not limited under fed-
eral law) and in-kind contributions (reportable and limited under federal
law). 9
But using coordination to regulate issue advertising is controversial,
since coordination would transform a form of political speech (an issue
ad) legally available to corporations and labor organizations into a form
prohibited to these entities (a federal contribution). The FEC has issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking containing a broad definition of coor-
dination, but has not yet promulgated a final rule.9°
FEC staff have also cited the coordination between the Clinton White
House and the DNC to argue that DNC issue advertisements were con-
88. H.R. 417 § 206(a)(1)(B) (proposed 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(C)(v)).
89. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)-(c) (1994) (reporting of independent expenditures);
§ 431(8)(A) (defining contribution to include in-kind contributions); § 441a (limiting con-
tributions). Courts have provided vague guidance on the constitutional standards applica-
ble to coordinated expenditures. See Pepper, supra note 43, at 152-53 (discussing the lack
of detailed standards for assessing the presence of coordination).
90. See Independent Expenditure and Party Committee Expenditure Limitations, 62
Fed. Reg. 24,367 (1997). Although this specific rule has not entered into effect, and has
not been judicially interpreted, one court indicated that there would be a constitutional
barrier to using a broad construction of "coordination" to regulate issue advocacy. See
Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309,1311 (1st Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 49:63
1999]When Does An Advertisement About Issues Become an "Issues Ad"? 87
tributions to Clinton/Gore. In the Clinton/Gore audit, among the items
of evidence of coordination were shared production expenses for adver-
tisements, the fact that DNC and Clinton ads were placed with the same
stations, and memoranda indicating that costs for advertising were split
as a matter of regular practice.9' FEC staff also noted that both DNC
and campaign advertisements dealt with the same issues and shared
polling information. 92 According to the audit report, the DNC's issue ad-
vertisements should have been reported and limited by the provisions of
federal law applicable to such contributions by parties to their presiden-
tial candidates.93
This conclusion rested upon the argument that coordinated expendi-
tures are contributions regardless of their content, and, thus, there is no
need to scrutinize such messages for express advocacy (or electioneering,
or any other content) if evidence of coordination is present. The audit
staff cited the Supreme Court's extension of less protection to "contribu-
tions" than to "expenditures" as legal support for this view.94
Just because an "independent expenditure" must constitutionally con-
tain express advocacy does not mean that an expenditure that is "coordi-
nated" under a broad interpretation of that word is suddenly denied the
protection provided by the express advocacy standard. If this were the
case, any political speech could be so limited or prohibited. All that
would be required is a sufficiently invasive definition for "coordination."
This Orwellian interpretation of federal law would not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.
III. CONCLUSION
Once recast as a definitional problem, it becomes easy to see that al-
most every attempt to isolate and regulate "campaign" issue advocacy is
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Broad redefinitions of "express
91. See CLINTON AUDIT REPORT, supra note 81, at 16-18.
92. See id. at 18-19.
93. See id. at 38-43.
94. See id. at 39. The audit staff argued that:
[A]s the Court noted in Buckley, "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordi-
nation of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent... alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate." By negative inference, one must conclude that the Court
recognized that the presence of prearrangement and coordination of an expendi-
ture with the candidate or his or her agent presents at least as much, if not
greater, danger of corruption or its appearance as does a direct contribution to
the candidate.
Id. at 40. (citations omitted).
Catholic University Law Review
advocacy" regulate lobbying advocacy beyond what the Constitution
permits. Blackout periods or time buffers set arbitrary and unsupported
standards that also reach lobbying advocacy. The "electioneering" for-
mulation, never defined, is too vague to be enforced against political ac-
tors; it also requires the speaker to predict the reaction of listeners to his
speech-what kind of definition is that?
In addition, no such standard will satisfy the problem regulators have
with the inventive character of political activists. Any standard providing
sufficient clarity to those regulated by it can also be evaded by those
same speakers who can then construct messages that fall outside the
scope of the standard." The solution is not to create broad, vague rules.
Instead, the solution is to leave these individuals and groups alone. Such
a proposal is neither new nor radical. Noted scholar Herbert Alexander,
in his analysis of the 1971 Act, stated that "[m]any authorities agree that
the present prohibitions are unenforceable, undesirable as public policy,
and perhaps unconstitutional, and that some or all of the restrictions
should be removed.,
96
Justices Brandeis and Holmes once prescribed that the preferred anti-
dote for the "danger[s] flowing from speech" was "more speech, not en-
forced silence., 97 This was a powerful statement in favor of political lib-
erty in 1927 and remains so today.
95. The Buckley Court understood that not all campaign related speech would be
captured by its "express advocacy" construction. The Court observed that
"[u]nscrupulous persons and organizations" could "skirt[] the restriction on express advo-
cacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefit[] the candidate's campaign," Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
96. HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 177 (1972).
97. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concur-
ring).
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